Every state needs an army, and Tajikistan is no different. In Tajikistan, the army is made up of multiple military and paramilitary branches, which all serve to protect the dictatorial regime of Emomali Rahmon from internal and external threat. This army js Rahmon's most important tool to keep power, but also the seems to be the greatest current threat to that same power.

History and origin of the armed forces

In most post-soviet states, the current structure of the armed forces is based on, at least originally, Soviet armed formations. In the Tajik SSR, the main armed formation had been the 201^st motor rifle division, which it follows should have been the backbone of the new military of the independent Tajikistan. Tajikistan was, however, not granted control of the division, which remained under Moscow’s command as a Russian foreign military installation.[1]

The 201^st had participated in the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s, where Central Asians notably were kept away from combat duty in favor of Slavs, especially Russians.[2] Central Asians being segregated into non-combat and supporting roles left Tajikistan upon independence with no army of its own and precious few soldiers with actual combat experience to make an army.

The Tajik civil war (1992-1997) certainly deserves an article in itself, but in this context it is important mainly as background for the state of the armed forces today. The lack of an army proved problematic enough that soon to be president Emomali Rahmon signed a decree to officially establish the Tajik armed forces on February 23^rd, 1993, nine months into the civil war.

Rahmon meets with the leader of the opposition, Said Nuri, to celebrate the peace in 1997. Photo from ITAR/TASS

The new armed forces were formed with a loyalist militia as its backbone, the Popular Front of Tajikistan, Rahmon's armed supporter group. While the first iteration of the army was made from a single militia, it would not be the only one. With the end of the civil war in 1997, most militias of the United Tajik Opposition would also be folded into the Tajik military, which was from then on made up of multiple conjoined and previously opposing militia groups.[3] This helps explain both the military’s relative weakness and the government’s distrust of it.

Rahmon’s greatest fear

Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon has in his 32 years in office done little good for the Tajik nation and people. In his time in office Tajikistan has remained a poor and underdeveloped country, with infrastructure and institutions rarely benefitting the people outside of the capital. Internationally, his regime has failed to resolve the border dispute with Kyrgyzstan to the north and is still hopelessly reliant on Russian protection against the Taliban ruled Afghanistan to the south and the ever-antagonistic Uzbekistan to the west. By design, Rahmon’s regime is deeply authoritarian, with systemic corruption and rampant human rights abuses.

An experienced Rahmon (then Rakhmonov) in his eighth year in power meeting with political newcomer Vladimir Putin in the year 2000. Russian government photo.

The problem is that a man in power does not need to be good at much else than keeping power, which Rahmon has proven himself to be exemplary at. The opposition fought a civil war for five years to remove him, and it ended with his position being confirmed. In the 27 years since, he has consistently made Tajikistan more dependent on himself, solidly making the country into a personalistic dictatorship. Empirical evidence shows us that personalistic dictators and their regimes are particularly likely to meet a violent end. In almost all cases where a personalistic regime falls, it falls through a violent event, and in 69% of cases the old dictator is either killed or dies in prison or exile.[4]

Without being a mind reader, it is impossible to know how much Rahmon knows about the threats to his regime, or if he is worried about it. However, with a 32-year pattern of doing everything to stay in power, it seems unlikely that the prospect of his regime collapsing is out of his mind. As late as June of this year Rahmon made a series of arrests against perceived and real opposition with the claim of a seemingly fictional coup attempt.[5] The supposed ringleader of this coup, Saidjafar Usmonzoda, is the recently deposed leader of the Democratic Party, which is very much a controlled opposition party.[6] Not even fake opposition survives in the current state of Tajikistan.

As age catches up to him, Rahmon has been grooming his son, Rustam Emomali, for his succession. As Rustam Emomali is deeply unpopular, and a Tajikistan not led by Rahmon is as of now untested, the coming succession process will likely be troubled.[7] Indeed, the latest crackdown is speculated to be linked to Rahmon’s worry that his turnover of power to his son will not go without issue. Rustam Emomali appears to be more at odds with the army than his father is, and rumors abound that he shot Saimumin Yatimov, the leader of the State Committee for National Security, over disagreements in military policy.[8]

Whatever Rahmon’s personal stance on the threat of the military is, there is real history in Tajikistan of insubordinate military leaders. As far as I’ve personally found, 11 senior commanders (see below, disgraced commanders section) of the Tajik military has either acted in armed opposition to the government or been arrested to prevent armed opposition to the government. In some of these cases there have been accusations that the regime has constructed the charges to remove possible opposition, though most regimes use accusations of corruption, not coups, to remove opponents.

Coup-proofing

Despite the staggering number of attempted and alleged rebellious actions by leading members of Tajikistan’s armed forces, none of them have gotten very far. This can be explained by three factors:

1. None of the rogue commanders have led opposition forces of a greater strength than a few dozen men.

2. In all cases of actual combat, security forces loyal to the state have acted quickly.

3. In no cases did the combat reach the sites of power.

The inability of disloyal commanders to seriously harm the Rahmon regime is due to a set of design choices in the organizational framework of the Tajik security services. For a coup to work, the organizers need a local superiority in armed force, at the sites of power, and to convince everyone else that the coup is really already over and that there’s no point in fighting them.[9]

The military unit tasked with the defense of the sites of power in Dushanbe is the National Guard, formerly known by the more fitting name of Presidential Guard. This National Guard is directly under the command of the president, which ensures safety in the capital as long as they remain loyal. The leader of the National Guard, Bobodzhon Dzhamolzoda, is something of an unknown character, unlikely to act against his patron Rahmon and unlikely to gain support from the other and larger armed branches if he made a move.

In studies of dictatorial politics the methods dictators use to keep their own general staffs away from their power is known as coup-proofing. One of the more popular and effective forms of coup-proofing is maintaining multiple overlapping security services that all have strength sufficient to check each other.[10] Regardless of whether or not it was intentional, Rahmon has mastered this technique. Through a needlessly complex military organizational web, Rahmon’s government wields what are essentially five different armies all separately answering to the president.

Org chart of all Tajik security forces. Purely administrative units shown in blue, major armed formations shown in green, minor armed formations shown in purple. Relational info gathered from government websites.

Increasing militarization

With the combination of maintaining the loyalty of the National Guard and keeping the other branches divided, Rahmon’s power is overall, as of today, relatively secure. This might change as other considerations force him to allow the military to grow and consolidate power. While Rahmon’s greatest current threat might be the military, as illustrated by the 2024 coup scare, he does also sorely need it to maintain power in other sectors. This can be a problem as the Tajik military is not only made up of former militia and split up into many different branches, it is also very weak, partially as an effect of the two previous facts.

The Tajik military on exercise to show their preparedness in the case of a Taliban attack in 2021. Tajik government photo.

For many years the Tajik government has been able to rely on Russian military protection, but developments during recent years have proven that Russian protection may not be as reliable as previously thought.[11] The Russian failure to protect Armenia should be worrying to Tajikistan, as their alliance with Russia is regulated by the same treaty as Armenia’s. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has already caused them to build down their capabilities in Tajikistan.[12]

In the context of faltering Russian support and the overall security picture in the region being hostile to Tajikistan, Rahmon has decided to bite the bullet and strengthen the military.[13] The buildup is monumental, from 2021 to 2024 it has risen from $80 million to $354 million.[14] A military buildup will place more power in the hands of top commanders, unless Rahmon keeps fracturing the forces into even more separated armed formations.

At the same time, the buildup might not be enough. A large spending increase does not cause an equal growth in actual military strength. Tajikistan’s rival Kyrgyzstan has made similar increases in their spending, granted to their already more powerful military.[15] If Tajikistan plans to keep up they will need to keep military spending at its current amount of more than 2% of GDP for years, which will place a strain on the country’s already underdeveloped economy.[16]

Conclusion

For now, Emomali Rahmon’s balancing act between his utilization and distrust of the military seems to be working. As long as his health holds and nothing major changes, he will remain in power. However, major things are changing, and his health is not holding. In the coming years, Rahmon will have to reckon with the implications of his own military buildup. He will also have to find a way to give his son Rustam power to continue the family dynasty, without angering his military staff which would allow Rustam to keep that power. Tajik military policy is central to this continuing story.

This article was originally going to be half as long and be about twice the number of topics. Needless to say, more articles about Tajikistan will be posted in the future. If you’re here for other topics than Tajikistan, don’t worry, I have other things planned.

Appendix: disgraced commanders

These eleven men were all at least senior commisioned officers of the Tajik military at some point, and they have all suffered consequences for their insubordination to Rahmon. It is unclear how many cases here are of real opposition and how many were constructed to centralize power. This list is most likely incomplete. There are no guarantees that all such cases reach the media, and there are no guarantees that I’ve found all the ones the media has reported on.

Of these men:

Three were lieutenant colonels, two were colonels, one was a major general, three were generals, and two held a brief and unspecified senior rank in the military after the civil war.

Five of them were killed by the Tajik government while one was killed by another government. Four were arrested and are still jailed, while one died in exile.

Five of them battled government forces directly after the civil war, one battled other governments, while the rest were killed or jailed for other reasons.

Two of the men fought on Rahmon’s side during the civil war, while the remaining nine had sided with the opposition.

The list

Mahmud Khudoiberdiyev, colonel. Despite fighting on Rahmon’s side he led three revolts in 1995-1996, 1997 and 1998 against Rahmon, one Uzbek backed during the civil war, one shortly before the end of the civil war and one shortly after.[17] He was half Uzbek and allegedly hid in Uzbekistan, causing an international incident. Khudoiberdiyev died in exile in 2001, though the Tajik government disputed news of his death and kept trying to find him for years after.[18] During the 1998 revolt he briefly captured much of the northern Sughd region, and is to date the greatest direct threat to Rahmon’s rule since the civil war.

Yakub Salimov, general, former minister of the interior. In 1992 he was part of the group that decided to make Rahmon president. Allegedly helped organize coup attempts in 1997 and 1998.[19] Salimov was arrested in Moscow and extradited in 2003, given 15 years in prison in 2005 and released from prison in 2016.[20] He was again arrested in 2024, this time on claims of helping organize Usmonzoda’s coup attempt. A few other influential politicians were also arrested, as well as the two civil war era warlords Salamsho Muhabbatov and Nazrullo Naimov.[21] A member of the exiled opposition claimed that a current general of the armed forces was prepared to carry out a coup, though the truth of that statement is up to debate.

Ghaffor Mirzoyev, general, head of the drug control agency. Arrested in 2004 and sentenced to life in prison in 2006 for a host of charges including drug trafficking, abuses of power, corruption, planning a coup and murder.[22] Fifteen junior officers apparently loyal to him were also arrested.

His brother Abdurasul was charged with illegal storage of weapons (3000 weapons stored in drug control agency sites and an anti-aircraft system stored at their family farm) after which he fled Tajikistan.[23] He was extradited from the UAE and arrested 2009, participated in a prison escape in 2010 with 24 others which killed five guards and was recaptured the same year.[24]

Mirzo Ziyoyev, general, former emergency services minister. Went into hiding to restart the struggle against the government, but was allegedly killed in 2009 by mafia associates. Was also allegedly captured by government forces before his killing, leading to speculation that he was summarily executed.[25] In the wake of his killing 46 of his associates were arrested, some of whom participated in the same prison escape as Abdurasul Mirzoyev.[26]

Mahmadruzi Iskandarov, retired commander. Formed the Democratic Party of Tajikistan. Accused of planning a coup and sentenced to 23 years in prison in 2005. He was transferred from prison to a penal colony in 2015, where he probably remains today.[27] His arrest marks the end of the Democratic Party as a serious opposition force.

Muhammadboqir Muhammadboqirov, lieutenant colonel. Removed from his position in the border guard because his men confiscated a batch of illegal drugs, in other words he did his job too well.[28] After years of pestering by the regime he was killed in 2022 by government forces without apparent reason.[29]

Tolib Ayombekov, lieutenant colonel. Implicated in the killing of major general Abdulla Nazarov in 2012, and led the subsequent battle against government forces that same year.[30] He surrendered, but remained a free man until his arrest in 2022.[31]

Imomnazar Imomnazarov, retired commander. Implicated in the killing of major general Abdulla Nazarov in 2012, but did not participate in the following clashes on account of his poor health. He was killed by government forces in his home during the violence.[32]

Abduhalim Nazarzoda, major general. In 2015 his followers attacked a police station and a defense ministry building. He fled to the countryside where he was later the same year killed by special forces. Colonel Rustam Amakiev, leader of the Alpha Group special force, was killed in the operation by Nazarzoda’s men.[33]

Juhaidulloh Umarov, colonel. Was part of Nazarzoda’s group and was killed alongside him.

Gulmurod Halimov, lieutenant colonel, chief of the special police. Left Tajikistan to join ISIS in 2015.[34] During his time in ISIS he worked as a recruiter and eventually became their “minister of war”, arguably reaching greater heights in the caliphate than he ever did in Tajikistan career wise. He never returned to Tajikistan and was claimed as killed on multiple occasions.[35] While his 2017 death was cast in doubt, he appears to be dead by now.